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Abstract
This Note argues that article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty, when applied, has failed to
resolve international water disputes between the United States and Canada. Part I of this Note
examines the history of the negotiations and the text of the Treaty. Part II reviews the subsequent
application of article II to international water disputes. Part III analyzes recent U.S. proposals to
divert water from Lake Michigan to drought-stricken areas in the context of the Treaty and cus-
tomary international water law. This Note concludes that article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty
is inadequate to resolve water disputes between the U.S. and Canada and should be renegotiated
to reflect customary principles of international water law.
NOTES
U.S.-CANADIAN RELATIONS REGARDING DIVERSIONS
FROM AN INTERNATIONAL BASIN: AN
ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE II OF THE
BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
INTRODUCTION
The Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain
Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and
Canada (the "Boundary Waters Treaty" or the "Treaty")' was
designed to settle existing and future disputes between the
United States and Canada over uses of boundary waters.2
While the Treaty was designed to resolve all international
water disputes between the United States and Canada,3 it has
been unable to resolve certain water conflicts that have arisen.4
To resolve these conflicts, the United States and Canada have
had to negotiate new treaties.
In particular, the United States and Canada dispute
whether article II of the Treaty, permitting unilateral and un-
limited diversions of certain waters, is an appropriate formula
for resolving international water problems. Although they
have been dropped, recent U.S. proposals to divert waters
from Lake Michigan to drought-stricken areas of the West and
Southwest have focused attention on this controversy once
again.'
This Note argues that article II of the Boundary Waters
Treaty, when applied, has failed to resolve international water
disputes between the United States and Canada. Part I of this
Note examines the history of the negotiations and the text of
the Treaty. Part II reviews the subsequent application of arti-
1. Jan. 1i, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.I.A.S. No. 12, at 319 [hereinafter Boundary
Waters Treaty].
2. Id. preamble, 36 Stat. at 2448, T.I.A.S. No. 12, at 319-20.
3. See id.; Johnson, The Columbia Basin, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS 182 (1967).
4. See infra notes 40-80 and accompanying text.
5. Id.
6. See generally Fire and Water, ECONOMIST, July 23, 1988, at 22-23 (discussing U.S.
proposals to divert water from Lake Michigan).
658
INTERNATIONAL BASIN DIVERSIONS 659
cle II to international water disputes. Part III analyzes recent
U.S. proposals to divert water from Lake Michigan to drought-
stricken areas in the context of the Treaty and customary inter-
national water law. This Note concludes that article II of the
Boundary Waters Treaty is inadequate to resolve water dis-
putes between the United States and Canada and should be
renegotiated to reflect customary principles of international
water law.
I. BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA
The United States and Canada use the waters of the Great
Lakes basin 7 for sanitary and domestic purposes, navigation,
irrigation, and power production.8 Controversies over the
uses of shared waters frequently arose in the nineteenth cen-
tury between the United States and Great Britain,' which ruled
Canada at the time.'0 In 1905, the United States and Great
7. The Great Lakes basin consists of the five Great Lakes, the tributary and con-
necting rivers, and the watershed area drained by these waterways. Hough, Geologic
Framework, in GREAT LAKES BASIN 3-4 (H. Pincus ed. 1962).
8. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (1958).
9. See Bourne, Canada and the Law of International Drainage Basins, in CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 468, 468-69 (1974).
The harbinger of diversion disputes came in 1841 when the waters of the
Allegash River in Maine were diverted from their natural channel by a canal
built between Lake Telos on the Allegash River and Webster Pond on the
Penobscot River; these waters used to flow into the Saint James River and
thus into Canada, but by this canal they were made to flow . . . through
Maine into the sea. Great Britain instructed its ambassador at Washington
to protest this diversion, but there is no record that he did so .... Before
many years had passed, diversions and proposed diversions for irrigation
purposes of the waters of the St. Mary and Milk rivers in the state of Mon-
tana and the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan became a subject of
conflict between the citizens and governments of the two countries. And in
the 1890s diversions of Great Lakes waters which would affect the genera-
tion of hydroelectric power at Niagara Falls and the division of the waters of
the Niagara River to be used for that purpose were matters of concern to
persons on both sides of the boundary.
Id. at 469. Thus, by 1900, there was an increasing number of conflicts between the
United States and Canada concerning the utilization of shared waters. Id. at 470.
10. See D. PIPER, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT LAKES 6 (1967). Canada did
not enjoy full independence during the nineteenth century, and it was not until 1923
that Canada obtained full powers in treaty-making. Id. Until that time treaties were
concluded by the United Kingdom on behalf of Canada. Id. Accordingly, many of
the conventional rules relating to the Great Lakes and U.S.-Canadian relations in
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Britain created the International Waterways Commission (the
"IWC") to report on the conditions and uses of waters adja-
cent to the U.S.-Canadian boundary., Although the IWC did
valuable work, it was a purely investigative body and had no
power to act upon or enforce its decisions.1 2 Realizing its in-
ability to resolve certain water disputes, the IWC in 1906, and
again in 1907, recommended a permanent commission that
could supervise and enforce decisions and rules.' As a result
of these recommendations, the United States and Canada, dur-
ing 1907 and 1908, entered into negotiations for a treaty.' 4
In negotiating the Boundary Waters Treaty, both the
United States and Canada wanted a single treaty that would
settle any water conflict that might arise between the two na-
tions. 15 The major difficulties in the negotiations centered on
the establishment of a mechanism for resolving disputes and
on diversions of certain waters by territorial owners.' 6 The Ca-
general were concluded with the United Kingdom and passed to Canada following its
attainment of full political independence. Id.
11. Bourne, supra note 9, at 470-71. The IWC was established as a result of a
Rivers and Harbors Act passed by the United States in 1902, embodying a provision
requesting the President of the United States to invite the British government to join
in the formation of an international commission on boundary waters. See An Act
Making Appropriations for the Construction, Repair, and Preservation of Certain
Public Works on Rivers and Harbors, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 154, § 4,
32 Stat. 331, 373 (1902); see also L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 8-
10 (discussing creation of the United States-Canada International Waterways Com-
mission).
12. See La Forest, Boundary Waters Problems in the East, in CANADA-UNITED STATES
TREATY RELATIONS 33 (D. Deener ed. 1963).
13. Id. at 33-34. The IWC's recommendation came at a time when there were
several ongoing water disputes between Canada and the United States: (i) a dispute
concerning the Lake of the Woods had been pending since 1888; (ii) a conflict con-
cerning the use of the waters of the St. Mary's River for power purposes required
settlement; and (iii) discussions regarding the use of the waters of the St. Mary and
Milk Rivers for irrigation purposes on either side of the boundary had been going on
for some time. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 10.
14. La Forest, supra note 12, at 34. Negotiations were conducted between James
Bryce, the British Ambassador to the United States, and Elihu Root, the U.S. Secre-
tary of State. Johnson, supra note 3, at 189. Mr. Bryce had the active assistance and
participation of Mr. Gibbons, a Canadian member of the International Waterways
Commission; William Pugsley, the Minister of Public Works in Canada; and Dr. W. F.
King, a member of the International Boundary Commission. Id.
15. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text; see also L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZ-
GERALD, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing negotiator's suggestion that one treaty be
entered into to resolve all river disputes).
16. See Memorandum by G.C. Gibbons, Numerical File 1906-10 U.S. Dept. of
State, Nat'l Archives 5934/3 1, at 1-6 (June 18, 1908) [hereinafter Memorandum by
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nadian negotiators proposed a commission with broad admin-
istrative and judicial powers to decide all boundary waters
questions in accordance with established principles. 7 Such a
commission would be able to resolve international water dis-
putes at a level below that of the two governments.' 8 The
United States opposed the Canadian suggestion and proposed
an investigative commission that could act as a judicial body to
decide certain cases referred to it by the two governments.' 9
With respect to diversions, the United States negotiators
cited the Harmon Doctrine as support for their position. 20
G.C. Gibbons]; see Bourne, supra note 9, at 471 (discussing major proposals submit-
ted during negotiation of the Treaty).
17. Memorandum by G.C. Gibbons, supra note 16, at 1; see also Scott, The Cana-
dian-American Boundary Waters Treaty: Why Article H?, 36 CAN. B. REV. 511, 514 (1958)
(discussing Canadian proposal for an international commission).
18. Scott, supra note 17, at 514.
19. W. GRIFFIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL WA-
TERS, S. Doc. No. 118, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1958).
20. See id. at 61; Austin, Canadian-United States Practice and Theory Respecting the
International Law of International Rivers: A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon
Doctrine, 37 CAN. B. REV. 391, 408 (1959); Note, Diverting Water from the Great Lakes:
Pulling the Plug on Canada, 20 VAL. L. REV. 299, 310 (1986) (discussing incorporation
of Harmon Doctrine into the Treaty). The Harmon Doctrine gets its name from an
opinion by Attorney General Judson Harmon in 1895 in regard to a complaint by
Mexico claiming U.S. interference with the flow of the Rio Grande in violation of
international law. Austin, supra, at 405-06. The opinion states in part:
The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sovereignty
of every nation, as against all others, within its territory. Of the nature and
scope of sovereignty with respect to judicial jurisdiction, which is one of its
elements, Chief Justice Marshall said ... :
"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extents of that restriction,
and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power
which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source."
The case presented is a novel one. Whether the circumstances make it
possible or proper to take any action from considerations of comity is a
question which does not pertain to this Department; but that question
should be decided as one of policy only, because, in my opinion, the rules,
principles, and precedents of international law impose no liability or obliga-
tion upon the United States.
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo-International Law, 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 281-83
(1895) (quoting Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 2 U.S. (7 Cranch) 478 (1812)).
Thus, the Harmon Doctrine states that there is no obligation or duty in interna-
tional law on any state to restrain the use of its waters to meet the needs of another
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Broadly speaking, this doctrine permitted each state to do as it
pleased with the portion of an international river found within
its borders, regardless of possible damage to the other riparian
state.2 The United States firmly adhered to the principles of
the Harmon Doctrine as established international law.22 For
its part, Canada wanted the Treaty to permit either state to
make diversions within its own territory only to the extent that
public or private interests in the other state would not be in-
jured.23
The critical issue during negotiation of the Treaty cen-
tered on article II, embodying the Harmon Doctrine of abso-
lute territorial sovereignty.24 Canada opposed the inclusion of
article II into the Treaty because it would permit any diversion
no matter how detrimental to the boundary waters or to the
other riparian nation involved.25 The United States, however,
insisted upon its right to do as it pleased within its own terri-
21tory. Seeking some kind of fixed agreement with the United
States respecting boundary waters generally,27 Canada finally
state. Austin, supra, at 408. Jurisdiction and control of a state over the waters of an
international river wholly in its territory is absolute. Id.
21. See supra note 20;Johnson, supra note 3, at 168. A riparian nation is a nation
whose land borders the bank of a river or stream. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1192
(5th ed. 1979).
22. See Austin, supra note 20, at 408; see also Bourne, supra note 9, at 472 (discuss-
ing U.S. adherence to Harmon Doctrine with respect to U.S. projects).
23. The Gibbons Papers, Public Archives of Canada, Letterbook 1, 490-92
[hereinafter Gibbons Papers]. The version of the article proposed by Canada stated:
[N]othing in this article is intended to authorize diversions in one country
which will seriously interfere with public rights . . . in boundary waters or
waters at a lower level than the boundary in rivers flowing across the bound-
ary; and while each of the High Contracting Parties reserves its sovereign
right of dealing with such diversion, each recognizes that it is desirable that
such right should not be unnecessarily exercised to the injury of public in-
terests in such boundary waters or in waters at a lower level than the bound-
ary in rivers flowing across the boundary.
Id. at 491; see also Bourne, supra note 9, at 471 (discussing Canadian proposal regard-
ing diversions).
24. See Gibbons Papers, supra note 23, at 490-92; see also L. BLOOMFIELD & G.
FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 13 (discussing negotiations leading to the Treaty).
25. See Gibbons Papers, supra note 23, at 491; see also L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZ-
GERALD, supra note 8, at 13 (discussing Canadian objections to article II).
26. See L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 13; see supra notes 20-22
and accompanying text.
27. See L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 13. Although the
Boundary Waters Treaty was concluded with the United Kingdom and signed by the
British Ambassador, it represented a crucial advance in Canada's attempt to achieve
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agreed to the inclusion of article II embodying the Harmon
Doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction. 28
In the end, the United States accepted a permanent com-
mission, and Canada reluctantly agreed to the U.S. position on
diversions. 29 Thus, the Treaty as it was finally adopted pro-
vided for the establishment of the International Joint Commis-
sion (the "IJC" or the "Commission") 3 0 and incorporated the
Harmon Doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction.'
The Treaty defines boundary waters as those along which
the international boundary between the United States and
Canada passes, but not including those tributary waters that
flow into boundary waters. 2 Article III of the Treaty provides
independent international status. D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 6-7. Canada welcomed
the opportunity to negotiate directly with the United States because it believed that
the United States would no longer dominate relations with Canada once Great Brit-
ain was out of the way. Id.
28. L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 13. Sir Wilfred Laurier,
Prime Minister of Canada, set out the reasons why Canada agreed to accept the Har-
mon Doctrine when it seemed to be a principle obviously harmful to its interests,
permitting the United States to justify diversions from Lake Michigan and to interfere
with the flow of rivers at other places:
[W]hether we liked it or did not like it, the United States had taken the posi-
tion that international law provides that ... the upper power has the right to
use the water within its own territory as it thinks best. What were we to do?
They might do so, and if they did so, they might do it to our injury and we
had no recourse whatever. Was it not wiser, then, under such circum-
stances, to say: Very well, if you insist upon that interpretation you will
agree to the proposition that if you do use your powers in that way you shall
be liable to damages to the party who suffers .... What wiser course could
have been adopted?
Austin, supra note 20, at 422 (quoting House of Commons Debates (Can.), Sess.
1910-1911, at 911-12).
29. Bourne, supra note 9, at 471.
30. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451, T.I.A.S. No.
12, at 323. The International Joint Commission, created under article VII of the
Boundary Waters Treaty, is composed of six commissioners, three from Canada and
three from the United States. Id. The Commission may, depending on the case re-
ferred to it, perform judicial, investigative, administrative, or arbitral functions. Id.
arts. VI-X, 36 Stat. at 2451-53, T.I.A.S. No. 12, at 322-25. The Commission bases its
decisions on general principles of international law, as well as the guidelines given in
the Treaty. D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 81. Once the Commission has issued a deci-
sion, its conditions are binding on all parties involved, whether governmental or pri-
vate., Id.
31. See Austin, supra note 20, at 421; Bourne, supra note 9, at 472-73.
32. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, preliminary art., 36 Stat. at 2448-49,
T.I.A.S. No. 12, at 320. The preliminary article states:
[F]or the purposes of this treaty boundary waters are defined as the waters
from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting water-
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that new diversions of boundary waters on one side of the line
that affect the natural level or flow of boundary waters on the
other side of the line can only be made with the approval of the
IJC." However, Lake Michigan, being wholly inside the
United States, is not part of the boundary waters, but is consid-
ered a tributary water because it flows into boundary waters. 4
Under article II of the Treaty, each nation reserved the right to
divert and control tributary waters within its territory,
although the other nation had the right to seek legal remedies
for any resulting injury.3 5 Therefore, if article II were to be
invoked, the United States could divert waters from Lake Mich-
igan, wholly within its territory, without the approval of the IJC
or Canada.
II. THE SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION OF ARTICLE II TO
INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES
Under article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty, no legal
limits can be imposed on a nation's right to divert waters
within its territory as it sees fit and no consideration need be
given to downstream uses or prior appropriations of any
ways, or the portions thereof, along which the international boundary be-
tween the United States and ... Canada passes, including all bays, arms, and
inlets thereof, but not including tributary waters which in their natural chan-
nels would flow into such lakes, rivers, and waterways ....
Id.
33. Id. art. III, 36 Stat. at 2449-50, T.I.A.S. No. 12, at 321. Article III states:
[I]t is agreed that.., no... diversions ... of boundary waters on either
side of the line, affecting the natural level or flow of boundary waters on the
other side of the line, shall be made except by authority of the United States
• . . or Canada .. . and with the approval . .. of ... the International Joint
Commission.
Id.
34. P. BALDWIN, LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO DIVERSIONS OF WATERS FROM LAKE
MICHIGAN TO THE Mississippi RIVER 2-3 (Cong. Res. Serv. Report for Congress No.
88-585A, Aug. 31, 1988).
35. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. II, 36 Stat. at 2449, T.I.A.S. No.
12, at 320-21; Baldwin, supra note 34, at 3. Article II states:
[E]ach of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself ... the exclusive
jurisdiction or control over the use and diversion . . . of all the waters on its
own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the
boundary or into boundary waters; but it is agreed that any intereference ...
resulting in any injury to the other side of the line . . . shall . . . entitle the
injured parties to . . . legal remedies ....
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. II, 36 Stat. at 2449, T.I.A.S. No. 12, at
320-21.
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sort.16 Although the United States embraced the Harmon
Doctrine and during negotiation of the Treaty stood firmly be-
hind its position that international law imposed no duties upon
it, in practice, it was not so inflexible in its attitude. 7
In subsequent international river disputes, the United
States and Canada realized that article II, embodying the doc-
trine of exclusive jurisdiction, was not a satisfactory means of
dealing with their common water problemsY.3  In each subse-
quent water dispute that could have been resolved by article II,
the United States and Canada negotiated separate treaties to
36. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. II, 36 Stat. at 2449, T.I.A.S.
No. 12, at 320-21. See generally Austin, supra note 20, at 439 (discussing Canada's
legal right to divert Columbia River under article II).
37. See Austin, supra note 20, at 409. Although the United States insisted on
incorporating the Harmon Doctrine into the Treaty, it has never, in practice, fol-
lowed the Harmon Doctrine and did not, in fact, follow it even in the negotiations
with Mexico when the doctrine is said to have originated. See Johnson, supra note 3,
at 205-06.
Despite early adherence to the Harmon Doctrine, the Harmon Doctrine was
never, in fact, a principle of international law. See Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 15, 22-23 (1967). But see supra text accom-
panying note 22. In making his pronouncement, Attorney General Harmon was sim-
ply stating that, in the absence of rules of international law applicable to this matter,
the United States could do as it pleased. See Lipper, supra, at 22. His opinion stated
only that "international law imposes no liability or obligation on the United States."
Id.
A review of domestic U.S. water law cases also shows that the Harmon Doctrine
was never accepted as a rule of domestic U.S. law. In the leading case of Kansas v.
Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902), Kansas sought to restrain Colorado, the upstream
state, from diverting the waters of the Arkansas River for irrigation purposes. Id. at
143. The state of Colorado argued that since the sources of the Arkansas River are in
Colorado, it could absolutely deprive Kansas of the right to use its share of the waters
in that river. Id. Colorado compared the position it occupied toward Kansas with the
position foreign states occupy toward each other. Id. Noting that the dispute in
question was similar to one between sovereign nations, the Court stated that it was
sitting as an international as well as a domestic tribunal. Id. at 146-47. The Court
rejected the Harmon Doctrine advocated by Colorado for a doctrine of equitable
apportionment. See Austin, supra note 20, at 433.
When the same case came before the Court again in 1907, the Supreme Court
held that where the right to use waters flowing across state lines is in controversy, the
dispute must be resolved on "the basis of equality of rights." Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 100 (1907). A line of authority reiterates this theory. See Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch
Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931). If the Supreme Court was, in deciding these
cases, applying principles of international law, as it often does, it was not applying
the strict principle of exclusive jurisdiction advocated by the United States in the
negotiations of the Boundary Waters Treaty. See Austin, supra note 20, at 434.
38. See infra notes 40-80 and accompanying text.
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resolve their differences, because article II was unable to pro-
vide effective solutions. 9
A. Early Application of the Harmon Doctrine
Article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty expressed the
view that diversions from purely national portions of interna-
tional waters are strictly matters of domestic concern.4 ° But, in
the Lake of the Woods Convention, 4 the United States and
Canada agreed to place non-boundary waters on an equal foot-
ing with boundary waters.42
Since 1888, riparian owners in the United States had been
complaining that their lands were being flooded as a result of a
dam built at the outlet of the Lake of the Woods in Canada. 43
In 1912, rather than rely on the Boundary Waters Treaty,
which would have permitted unilateral diversions of the tribu-
tary waters of this lake, the United States and Canada referred
their problem to the IJC.4 4 The two governments asked the
IJC to investigate and report on the practicability and desira-
bility of regulating the level of the lake during different sea-
sons of the year.45
The IJC recommended that, as a matter of sound interna-
tional policy, neither nation should permit the permanent or
temporary diversion of any waters within its jurisdiction that
are tributary to the boundary waters under consideration,
without first referring the proposed diversion to the Commis-
sion for recommendation. 46 Based on the Commission's rec-
ommendation, the two governments requested that the Com-
mission draft a separate treaty.47 Accordingly, the United
States and Canada side-stepped the Harmon Doctrine by
39. Id.
40. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. II, 36 Stat. at 2449, T.I.A.S. No.
12, at 320-2 1; see Austin, supra note 20, at 425.
41. Treaty and Protocol Between the United States and Great Britain in Respect
of Canada to Regulate the Level of the Lake of the Woods, Feb. 24, 1925, 44 Stat.
2108; T.I.A.S. No. 6, at 14 [hereinafter Lake of the Woods Treaty].
42. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text; Bourne, supra note 9, at 484.
43. Bourne, supra note 9, at 470.
44. INT'LJOINT COMM'N, IJC DOCKET No. 3, LAKE OF THE WOODS LEVELS (1912),
reprinted in L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 72-75.
45. Id.
46. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE LAKE OF THE WOODS REFERENCE
38 (1917).
47. See L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 74-75.
1989] INTERNATIONAL BASIN DIVERSIONS 667
agreeing, under article XI of the Lake of the Woods Treaty of
1925,48 to prohibit diversion of any water from the lake's basin
without the approval of the IJC.49 By placing both boundary
and tributary waters under the jurisdiction of the IJC, the
United States and Canada departed significantly from the
Boundary Waters Treaty. 50 It is evident from this early con-
vention that the United States and Canada could not rely on
article II of the Treaty. Rather, the onerous terms of the Har-
mon Doctrine forced the parties to negotiate a separate treaty.
At the same time, the United States was changing its view
of the Harmon Doctrine with respect to river disputes involv-
ing Mexico. In 1922, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover
requested an opinion from the State Department as to Mex-
ico's rights to the waters of the Colorado River.5 ' In the opin-
ion, Secretary of State Charles Hughes stated that the United
States could build projects within its own territory even though
this might interfere with the flow of the Colorado River.52 As
authority, he cited the opinion of Attorney General Harmon.53
But Secretary Hughes also stated that the United States had
never stood rigidly on its legal rights but had always taken into
consideration matters of equity and comity. 54 According to
Secretary Hughes, such matters required that the interests of
Mexico be taken fully into consideration.
48. Lake of the Woods Treaty, supra note 4 1, art. XI, 44 Stat. at 2111, T.I.A.S.
No. 6, at 18.
49. Id. Article XI of the Lake of the Woods Treaty states: "No diversion shall
henceforth be made of any waters from the Lake of the Woods watershed to any
other watershed except by authority of the United States or ... Canada within their
respective territories and with the approval of the International Joint Commission."
Id.; see also Austin, supra note 20, at 425-26 (discussing early application of Harmon
Doctrine in context of the Lake of the Woods problem).
50. Compare Lake of the Woods Treaty, supra note 41, art. XI, 44 Stat. at 2111,
T.I.A.S. No. 6, at 18 with Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 1, art. II, 36 Stat. at
2449, T.I.A.S. No. 12, at 320-21; see Bourne, supra note 9, at 483-84.
51. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL WATER COMMIS-
SION UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, H.R. DOC. No. 359, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 261
(1922) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WATER COMMISSION]; see also Aus-
tin, supra note 20, at 426-27 (discussing Herbert Hoover's request for an opinion
from State Department).
52. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 262-
63.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 263.
55. Id.
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In 1927, Congress authorized the President to cooperate
with Mexico in the study of the Colorado, Tijuana, and Lower
Rio Grande Rivers, 56 and negotiations proceeded through the
1930s for an agreement concerning the distribution of these
waters.57 In 1944, the United States and Mexico signed the
Treaty of Washington (the "Treaty of 1944"),58 bringing to
rest over sixty years of disagreement between these two na-
tions over their shared water resources. 59  Here, the United
States, for the first time in a formal agreement, was willing to
put limits on the extent to which an upstream nation might
divert waters so as not to injure interests downstream. 60 This
represented a significant departure from the earlier U.S. posi-
tion that there is no duty in international law on any state to
restrain its use of the waters within its territory. 6'
B. The Columbia River Controversy: A Reinterpretation
of Article II?
In 1951, the United States applied to the IJC for approval
to build the Libby Dam to develop the waters of the Columbia
56. Joint Resolution Amending the Act of May 13, 1924, ch. 381, 44 Stat. 1403
(1927).
57. See Austin, supra note 20, at 428.
58. Treaty of Washington, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.I.A.S. No. 9, at 1166;
see also Austin, supra note 20, at 428-31 (discussing treaty document).
59. See Austin, supra note 20, at 428. As early as 1880, the United States and
Mexico were disputing diversions of the Rio Grande, a boundary water that makes up
approximately 60% of the border between the two nations. Id. at 405. In 1895, the
Mexican Minister in Washington complained to the U.S. Secretary of State about
U.S. diversions from the upper Rio Grande river at a point wholly within U.S. terri-
tory. Id. at 405-06. It was in this context that Attorney General Harmon issued his
famous opinion. Id. at 406.
A controversy between the United States and Mexico also arose over the devel-
opment of the Colorado River. Id. at 410. In 1898, Mexico objected to large projects
for irrigation being planned or undertaken by the United States because it feared that
such projects would exhaust the flow and disrupt the free navigation of the Colorado
River. Id. Controversies over the Colorado River continued during the 1920s and
1930s, and it was not until 1944 that the United States and Mexico were finally able
to reach an agreement concerning the disposition of these waters. Id. at 411.
60. Id. at 429.
61. Id. Mr. John G. Laylin, in a document submitted to the International Law
Association at its Dubrovnik Conference in 1956, argues that the United States, by
this treaty, had abrogated the Harmon Doctrine. See Laylin, The Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers, in PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING THE USES OF INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS 1, 7-8 (1956).
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River system.62 The Columbia River flows from Canada across
the international boundary into the United States.63 When the
United States refused to meet Canadian demands for sharing
the downstream benefits associated with the construction of
the dam, Canada considered the possibility of diverting water
from the Columbia River within its territory into other rivers.64
Such a diversion would have damaged hydroelectric facilities
in the United States65 and frustrated the U.S. plans for devel-
opment.
The Canadians argued that article II of the Boundary Wa-
ters Treaty, embodying the Harmon Doctrine, clearly gave
Canada the legal authority to carry out diversions of the Co-
lumbia River.6 6 The State Department denied that the Bound-
ary Waters Treaty incorporated the Harmon Doctrine and ar-
gued that Canada had no legal right to divert under such cir-
cumstances.67 The United States argued that article II was
62. INT'LJOINT COMM'N, IJC DOCKET No. 65, LIBBY DAM (1951), reprinted in L.
BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 190-92. The dam was to be con-
structed on the main portion of the Kootenay River, near Libby, Montana, where the
river extends into the United States. Johnson, supra note 3, at 198. The dam would
have raised the water level at the border 150 feet and would have formed a large
storage reservoir extending 42 miles into Canada. Id.
63. Bourne, The Columbia River Controversy, 37 CAN. B. REV. 444, 446 (1959).
64. See A. McNaughton, Statement to the House of Commons Committee on
External Affairs 17-40 (Mar. 9, 1955) (available at the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal office); see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 201-09 (discussing Canadian threats to
divert water from Columbia River into Fraser River).
65. See Lipper, supra note 37, at 25-26.
66. See A. McNaughton, supra note 64, at 17; see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 203
(discussing Canadian view of Canada's legal right to divert without U.S. consent).
One of the principal proponents of the Canadian view was Mr. J. Austin, who argued
as follows: "In the light of the history of [article II] it is abundantly clear that no legal
limits can be set to Canada's right to divert the waters of the Columbia as she sees fit
and that no regard need be had to downstream uses or prior appropriations of any
sort." Austin, supra note 20, at 439. In preface to his argument Austin wrote:
[I]n actual fact, the rights and obligations of the two nations do not rest on
the general principles of international law, which are irrelevant to the mat-
ter, but on the definitive Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 which was agreed
to by both states in order to set out the principles which would bind them in
the regulation of disputes concerning their international water resources. It
is to this treaty then that we must turn.
Id. at 438.
67. W. GRIFFIN, supra note 19, at 59. In a State Department memorandum, Grif-
fin argued that neither the United States nor Canada had seriously urged the Har-
mon Doctrine in the negotiations over the Boundary Waters Treaty, and he sup-
ported this position by claiming that the disputes over the Milk and St. Mary's Rivers
(which were settled in the Treaty) were approached by both sides and resolved on the
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simply an expression of customary international law, embody-
ing the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty. 68 Limited
territorial sovereignty restricts the principle of absolute sover-
eignty so that riparians can share in the use and benefits of a
system of international waters on ajust and reasonable basis.69
The United States and Canada requested the IJC to carry
out investigations and make recommendations for further uses
and developments of the waters of the Columbia River sys-
tem.7" In the two references having to do with the Columbia
River, however, the IJC was unable to reach decisions."' To
break the stalemate, the Commission was requested in 1959 to
submit a special report on the question of determination and
apportionment of benefits resulting from the cooperative use
of water storage and electrical generation. 72 In making its de-
cisions, the IJC relied on a report submitted by the Interna-
tional Columbia River Engineering Board, appointed in 1944
to research the problem of development of the Columbia
River. 7' The Board regarded electrical power and flood con-
trol as the primary benefits of the basin and emphasized the
advantage of joint development between the two nations. 4
The IJC, in turn, recommended joint development of the basin
basis of equitable apportionment. Id. at 59-60. He also argued that the Treaty provi-
sions permitting the downstream injured party to use the courts of the upstream
country to seek compensation for injuries suffered as a result of a diversion was not a
confirmation of the Harmon Doctrine but a denial of it. Id. at 61-62. In many cases,
because of the different legal systems used in the two countries, no legal redress
would be available to the injured party. Id. at 61. In such instances, the intent of the
Treaty was that the question should be referred to the IJC for report and recommen-
dation in line with general principles of international law; these principles, he
claimed, supported "equitable apportionment," not the Harmon Doctrine. Id. at 62;
see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 203-04 (discussing U.S. view on Canada's legal right
to divert under article II).
68. See W. GRIFFIN, supra note 19, at 59-62; see also Lipper, supra note 37, at 26
(discussing State Department's interpretation of article II).
69. See Lipper, supra note 37, at 18.
70. INT'LJOINT COMM'N, IJC DOCKET No. 69, LIBBY DAM AND RESERVOIR (1954),
& INT'LJOINT COMM'N, IJC DOCKET No. 51, COLUMBIA RIVER (1944), reprinted in L.
BLOOMFIELD & G. FiTZGERALD, supra note 8, at 164-70, 192-95.
71. See generally L. TECLAFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 439 (1985)
(discussing deliberations of the Commission as well as diplomatic negotiations).
72. See id. ; Johnson, supra note 3, at 217.
73. See L. TECLAFF, supra note 71, at 439. For a discussion of the Engineering
Report and reaction to the report, see Johnson, supra note 3, at 211-16.
74. See L. TECLAFF, supra note 71, at 439.
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and an equal sharing of benefits. 75 The Harmon Doctrine, ex-
pressed in article II, was rejected as an inappropriate solution
to this or any other international water dispute.76
After the IJC submitted its report, the United States and
Canada, rather than rely on article II as a way to resolve the
dispute, decided to proceed with negotiations of a new
treaty.77 On January 17, 1961, the United States and Canada
signed the Columbia River Basin Treaty,78 which prohibited a
unilateral diversion of certain waters within the Columbia
River basin 79 and called for an equal sharing of the down-
stream power benefits between the two nations.8 ° Application
of article II would have made joint planning and development
an impossibility. Once again, realizing the inadequacy of the
Boundary Waters Treaty to solve the complex problems asso-
ciated with development of an international river system, the
United States and Canada negotiated a separate water treaty to
settle their differences.
C. Principles of Customary International Law Governing Systems of
International Waters
In negotiating the Lake of the Woods Treaty and the Co-
lumbia River Treaty, the United States and Canada realized
that article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty was not the best
vehicle for resolving water disputes and, instead, relied on
emerging principles of international water law. 8 These con-
cepts include: (i) consulting with co-riparian nations before
beginning water projects or diversions that will affect them;82
(ii) planning the development of drainage basins through in-
ternational or joint commissions instead of nations acting indi-
75. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 217.
76. Id. at 168.
77. See L. TECLAFF, supra note 71, at 440; Johnson, supra note 3, at 218-19.
78. Jan. 17, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
79. Id. art. XIII, para. 1, 15 U.S.T. at 1565, T.I.A.S. No. 5638, at 11.
80. Id. art. V, 15 U.S.T. at 1560, T.1.A.S. No. 5638, at 6.
81. See supra notes 40-80 and accompanying text.
82. See Bourne, Procedure in the Development of Internatio),,. Drainage Basins: The
Duty to Consult and to Negotiate, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 212, 233 (1972); Caponera, Pat-
terns of Cooperation in International Water Law: Principles and Institutions, in L. TECLAFF,
TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES LAW 1, 7-9 (1987).
1989]
672 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 12:658
vidually;83 and (iii) dividing available water for use among na-
tions according to the principle of equitable apportionment.8 4
A survey of the traditional sources of international law85 shows
83. See Caponera, supra note 82, at 10-25; Ely & Wolman, Administration, in THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 124, 124-25 (1967).
84. Bourne, supra note 9, at 475; see Caponera, supra note 82, at 4-7.
85. According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the basic
sources of international law are:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles recognized by civilized nations;
d. .. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publi-
cists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, T.I.A.S. No. 3, at 1187.
It is generally accepted that agreement and custom are major sources of interna-
tional law. Hayton, The Formation of the Customary Rules of International Drainage Basin
Law, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 842 (1967).
That existing general international law in a given field may be traceable to
the rules of a universally, or virtually universally adhered to "law-making"
multilateral treaty is known to all. It is usually conceded that such "interna-
tional legislation" makes a quite direct contribution to general international
law. In addition, a widely adhered to treaty might openly purport to be
merely, or primarily declaratory of the existing customary law. Such formal
codification, or restatement may be limited legally speaking to the role of
"some evidence" in the process of the proof of the law; however, sociologi-
cally speaking, the individual and collective state activity that brought forth
the declaratory treaty is itself state practice, reinforcing (in this instance) the
customs-not just providing proof of them. Even bilateral agreements can
serve these functions of evidencing and strengthening the customary rules,
by manifesting the intention of the framers to affirm, on the whole, the ex-
isting law.
Id. at 861-62.
It also has been generally stated and accepted that unwritten, informal norms
may reflect binding rules and principles of international law. Id. at 843.
Custom in its legal sense means something more than mere habit or usage;
it is a usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory one. There must
be present a feeling that, if the usage is departed from, some form of sanc-
tion will probably, or at any rate ought to, fall on the transgressor. Evidence
that a custom in this sense exists in the international sphere can be found
only by examining the practice of states; that is to say, we must look at what
states do . . . and attempt to understand why they do it, and in particular
whether they recognize an obligation to adopt a certain course or, in the
words of Article 38 [of the Statute of the International Court ofJustice], we
must examine whether the alleged custom shows "a general practice ac-
cepted as law."
J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 59-60 (6th ed. 1963).
Judicial decisions and opinions may also reflect customary international practice.
Hayton, supra, at 845.
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that these concepts are becoming part of general international
law. 6
1. The Duty to Consult with a Co-Riparian Nation
International law imposes a duty on a riparian nation to
consult with co-riparian nations before beginning a project or
diversion that would affect shared waterways.8 7 This obliga-
tion has become recognized during the twentieth century by
international tribunals.8 For example, the International Court
of Justice, in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration89 and North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf,90 has held that an obligation to consult and negoti-
ate arises out of customary international law. 9'
Decisions and opinions by courts and quasi-judicial bodies of a particu-
lar state frequently are the most accessible and legally sufficent manifesta-
tions of that state's legal position on many technical international, or foreign
relations matters and are often resorted to .....
International tribunal "precedent" and legal grounds announced by in-
ternational tribunals for their decisions may themselves be admissible as
some evidence of customary state practice, at least in the absence of wide-
spread state criticism of, or objection to the Court's or other tribunal's for-
mulations.
Id. at 845-54.
Commentators of international law treatises have always been relied on and cited
with frequency in the international legal community. Id. at 857-58.
The actual influence of any given writer aside, what justifies use of commen-
tators ... is the assistance their works can render in analysis of the problem,
in making available more of the voluminous, equivocal and inaccessible rec-
ord of state practice, and in articulating concisely the recognized or devel-
oping legal principles and rules involved.
Id. at 860.
86. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
88. See Bourne, supra note 82, at 218-20.
89. (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (Arb. Trib. 1957).
90. (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
91. In Lake Lanoux, the Court concluded:
International practice reflects the conviction that States ought to strive
to conclude... agreements: there would thus appear to be an obligation to
accept in good faith all communications and contracts which could, by a
broad comparison of interest and by reciprocal good will, provide States
with the best conditions for concluding agreements.
Lake Lanoux, 24 I.L.R. at 130.
Similarly, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the court held that the par-
ties were under an obligation to delimit the areas of the North Sea continental shelf'
by negotiating in good faith with a view to reaching an agreement in accordance with
equitable principles. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 46-47, 53-54.
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The obligation to consult with co-riparian nations is
designed to ensure that a nation will not utilize the waters of
an international drainage basin without knowledge of all rele-
vant facts.9 2 By consulting with other states, a nation can real-
ize the maximum efficient use of shared resources or, at the
very least, ascertain the legal ramifications of its proposed ac-
tions.
2. Drainage Basin Development-the Community Theory
Drainage basin development, or the community approach
to international waters, stresses mutual development of a
river's waters by all riparian nations.94 This approach derives
from the practical consideration that the geography of a river
often has little if any relationship to the political frontiers that
separate it, and in order to make maximum use of its waters, it
is often necessary to develop an integrated program for the
whole drainage basin.95 Under this theory, the joint efforts of
the participating states are utilized to best develop the basin
for their joint benefit without regard to state borders. 6
International commissions are able to bring representa-
tives of interested nations together to cooperate in joint plan-
ning for comprehensive river development. 97 Joint or interna-
tional commissions may also have the power to organize inves-
tigations, undertake studies, and issue recommendations
regarding development of shared waterways.98 Thus, such
commissions may play an important role during the beginning
stages of the development process, when unified planning is
most needed. 99
The extent of cooperation that exists along the U.S.-Cana-
dian boundary and the importance of an international commis-
sion in that relationship were evident in the Lake of the Woods
Convention and Columbia River dispute. There is little doubt
92. See Bourne, supra note 82, at 230.
93. See id.
94. See D. LEMARQUAND, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: THE POLITICS OF COOPERATION
13 (1977).
95. See Lipper, supra note 37, at 38.
96. See id. at 39.
97. Ely & Wolman, supra note 83, at 137.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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that an impartial commission and a treaty that endorses equal-
ity have been important ingredients to the success that the
United States and Canada have achieved in their relations con-
cerning international waters.' 00
3. Limited Territorial Sovereignty-the Equitable
Utilization Theory
The United States has interpreted article II of the Bound-
ary Waters Treaty as embodying the principle of limited terri-
torial sovereignty. 0 1 The limited territorial sovereignty prin-
ciple, also known as equitable utilization, recognizes the equal
rights of co-riparian nations. 10 2 Under this theory, each nation
has an equal right to utilize shared waterways in accordance
with its needs. 10 3 Thus, each state riparian to a river that bor-
ders upon or crosses two or more states has an equality of
right with every other co-riparian state to use the waters of the
river in a reasonable and beneficial manner. 0 4 The doctrine of
equitable utilization has attracted overwhelming support and is
now considered an established principle of customary interna-
tional law.'o 5
The limited sovereignty principle was expressed in the
Lake Lanoux Arbitration.'0 6 In significant dictum, the tribunal
concluded that not only does current international practice re-
quire the safeguarding of the riparian rights of a neighboring
100. See U.N. DEP'T OF TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT, EXPER-
IENCES IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RIVER AND LAKE
BASINS at 284, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/120, U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.A.17 (1981).
101. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
102. Lipper, supra note 37, at 44-45.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 63.
105. See Bourne, supra note 9, at 475. The U.S. Supreme Court first announced
the doctrine in 1907 in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Since then, the
Supreme Court has elaborated and refined the doctrine in Wyoming v. Colorado,
259 U.S. 419 (1922), and Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
The doctrine of equitable utilization reached a firm place in international law
when it was embodied into the Helsinki Rules adopted by the International Law As-
sociation in 1966. See Bourne, supra note 9, at 475. Article IV of the Helsinki Rules
formulates as a rule of general international law that "each basin state is entitled,
within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the
waters of an international drainage basin." INT'L LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE FIFT-
SECOND CONFERENCE 484 (At~g. 14-20, 1967) (held at Helsinki).
106. (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101, 138 (Arb. Trib. 1957); see Lipper, supra note
37, at 29.
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state, but account must be taken of all interests that might be
affected by the proposed projects, even if those interests do
not correspond to a right. 0 7 The opinion went further, re-
quiring notice of proposed diversions and good-faith negotia-
tions toward agreement as requisite to the utilization of an in-
ternational watercourse where such utilization might impair
the interests of another riparian state.' 08
Perhaps the best known of the international decisions in-
volving the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty is the
Trail Smelter Arbitration.'°9 In deciding how to remedy the in-
jury caused to U.S. interests by deleterious fumes being carried
over the border by air currents from Canadian factories, the
tribunal in the Trail Smelter Arbitration stated in dictum that
under customary principles of international law, a state could
not use or permit the use of its territory in such a way as to
adversely affect by fumes the territory of another state.'" An
analogy can be drawn here between allowing the escape of
harmful fumes across a border causing injury, and diverting
waters to the injury of a co-riparian state." The tribunal
would most likely have reached the same conclusion if stored
waters were released by Canada causing severe flood damage
in the United States." 2
Both the United States and Canada acknowledged the lim-
ited territorial sovereignty principle when they signed the Co-
lumbia River Treaty, which embodied the fifty-fifty principle
and mutual development ideas advocated by the IJC." 3
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE II TO RECENT U.S.
PROPOSALS TO DIVERT
The five Great Lakes, which, with the exception of Lake
107. Lake Lanoux, 24 I.L.R. at 138.
108. Id. at 119, 127-28.
109. Trail Smelter Arbitration Between the United States and Canada Under
Convention of April 15, 1935, Decision of the Tribunal Reported March 11, 1941,
reprinted in 35 AM. J. IN'L L. 684 (1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter Arbitration].
110. Id. at 716.
111. See Lipper, supra note 37, at 30.
112. Id.; cf. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (concluding that
relief is available where one state floods an interstate stream to the detriment of an-
other state).
113. The Columbia River Basin Treaty, supra note 78; see Johnson, supra note 3,
at 219; supra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
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Michigan, straddle the boundary between Canada and the
United States, contain ninety-five percent of the fresh water in
the United States. 1 4 As water demand becomes more acute in
this nation, greater attention will be directed to the Great
Lakes,' ' 5 which form the largest body of fresh water in the
world, containing 5,439 cubic miles of water. 1 6 With little
precipitation, an increasing population, the drying up of un-
derground waters sources (aquifers), and an important agricul-
tural sector to support, states in the West and Southwest have
been troubled by severe water shortages. "7 While there are
no immediate proposals to divert water from the Great Lakes
basin to these troubled areas, large out-of-basin diversions
may be suggested in the future.' 8
Recent U.S. proposals to divert water from Lake Michigan
to the Mississippi River have been suggested to relieve the ex-
treme drought conditions of 1988, which resulted in record
low water levels in the Mississippi River.'"' These proposals
114. Fire and Water, supra note 6, at 22.
115. See Poston, Great Lakes Water Supply-the Years Ahead, in GREAT LAKES BASIN
293 (H. Pincus ed. 1962); see also Quade, Water Wars Predicted in a Thirsty Nation, 68
A.B.A.J. 1066 (1982).
116. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 520 (120th ed. 1988).
117. See Quade, supra note 115, at 1066-67; Shapiro, First Volleys of New Water
Wars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 30, 1988, at 20; Taylor, Water: The Nation's Next
Resource Crisis, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 18, 1985, at 64; Note, supra note 20, at
300-02; Frazier & Schlender, Running Dry: Huge Area in Midwest Relying on Irrigation is
Depleting its Water, Wall St.J., Aug. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 6. These states are included in
the Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 391 (1982): Arizona, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
118. See Quade, supra note 115, at 1066.
119. See Baldwin, supra note 34, at 1. With the support of Senator Robert Dole,
the Senate minority leader, and Senator Paul Simon, among others, James Thomp-
son, the governor of Illinois, argued that such a diversion was necessary, because the
low water levels of the Mississippi were having a serious impact on commercial barge
operators. See Fire and Water, supra note 6, at 22.
In a letter to the President of the United States dated July 8, 1988, 13 U.S. sena-
tors urged that the President order an emergency diversion of water from the Great
Lakes to prevent economic devastation and potential health hazards to the nation's
heartland, which is served by the Mississippi River:
These record low water levels are literally bringing barge traffic on the
Mississippi to a halt . . . . While some passages of the river have been
cleared, as many as 3,000 barges have been blocked on the Mississippi be-
cause of low water levels.
The economic impact of this natural disaster is staggering. Several
large barge companies are forecasting losses in the range of $1 million to $7
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are controversial in that they involve the unilateral transfer of
water from a major international basin, would affect lake levels
and commerce, and could affect Canadian interests as well. 120
The United States has defended any proposed diversion from
Lake Michigan under article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty,
arguing that Canadian approval is not needed, because Lake
Michigan is surrounded by U.S. territory.' 2'
During negotiations of the Boundary Waters Treaty, the
United States insisted upon the principle that a state can do as
it pleases with the waters in its territory and eventually ob-
tained the embodiment of this principle in article 11.122 How-
ever, as past events indicate, article II is inadequate and fails to
provide a workable solution to international water disputes be-
tween the United States and Canada. 23
Whenever an international water dispute between the
United States and Canada could have been resolved according
to article II, the parties disregarded article II and, instead, en-
tered into a new treaty to settle their differences. 24 For exam-
ple, rather than rely on article II in the Lake of the Woods
dispute, the United States and Canada requested the IJC to
million per month of the drought. The American Waterways Operators esti-
mates that the total loss to the barge and towing industry due to the drought
will exceed $60 million.
Moreover, steadily declining water levels in the Mississippi pose poten-
tial health threats to many communities. Several communities face the pros-
pect of their drinking water being rendered unusable as the drought contin-
ues ....
Expeditious action on this request could help avert further economic
and health problems associated with the drought in our nation's heartland.
Letter to the President of the United States 1-4 (July 8, 1988).
120. See Baldwin, supra note 34, at I. Any significant diversion from Lake Michi-
gan would have profound implications for Canada with respect to navigation, recrea-
tion, and commercial interests. House of Commons, Question Period (July 7, 1988) (Can.)
(statement of T. McMillan). Arguments have been made that such a diversion would
have a serious impact on water levels in Lake Huron and in Lake Erie as well as in
Lake St. Clair and would affect all the communities along the Canadian side of those
lakes. House of Commons, Question Period (July 7, 1988) (Can.) (statement of S. Lang-
don).
12 1. See Fire and Vater, supra note 6, at 22. Article II gives each nation the exclu-
sive right to divert and control its own tributary waters. Boundary Waters Treaty,
supra note 1, art. II, 36 Stat. at 2449, T.I.A.S. No. 12, at 320-21; see Baldwin, supra
note 34, at 2-3.
122. Austin, supra note 20, at 421; see supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 40-80 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 38-50 and 77-80 and accompanying text.
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draft the Lake of the Woods Treaty to prohibit unilateral and
unlimited diversions from the lake's basin.' 25 Article XI of this
treaty modifies the provision of article II of the Boundary Wa-
ters Treaty by requiring the approval of the IJC for any diver-
sion out of the lake's basin.'" 6 As early as 1925, both nations
seem to have realized the ineffectiveness of the doctrine of ab-
solute territorial jurisdiction in article II and recognized the
importance of resolving conflicts through an international
joint commission.
Article II also failed to resolve the Columbia River contro-
versy. 1 2 7 By signing the Columbia River-Treaty of 1961, the
United States seems to have put its faith in general interna-
tional law to protect itself against the possibility of unilateral
diversions out of an international waterway. 28 Although most
in the United States as well as Canada agreed that article II
embodied the doctrine of absolute territorial jurisdiction, they
also concluded that it was wholly inadequate as a solution to
international river conflicts.' 29 The Harmon Doctrine ex-
presses an absolute sovereign philosophy more in tune with
the pre-industrial revolution era of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries rather than with the close economic, social,
and political ties that characterize our present world.' °
During the Columbia River controversy, the United States
interpreted article II of the Treaty as embodying a principle of
limited territorial sovereignty.' The U.S. position appears to
be that each state has absolute sovereignty over its territory
including any waters flowing through it.' 1 2 However, interfer-
ence by one nation that would affect the use of the waters of a
shared basin by another nation may constitute an interference
with the latter's sovereignty and, thus, violate international
125. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
126. Lake of the Woods Treaty, supra note 41, art. XI, 44 Stat. at 2111, T.I.A.S.
No. 6, at 18; see L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 75; supra notes 48-
50 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
128. See L. TECLAFF, supra note 71, at 441 (discussing U.S. acceptance of interna-
tional law with respect to Columbia River Treaty).
129. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 168.
130. See id. at 235.
131. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
132. See Lipper, supra note 37, at 26.
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law. '3 In other words, the sovereignty of each nation acts re-
ciprocally to restrict the actions of each nation toward the
other.'34 An amended article II that recognizes this principle
of limited territorial sovereignty would be more effective in
resolving international water disputes.
Additionally, in both the Columbia River and Lake of the
Woods disputes, the United States and Canada submitted ref-
erences to the IJC for review and recommendation,' 3 5 rather
than depend on article II as a way to resolve their problems.
The use of a joint commission to resolve disputes that could
have been resolved according to article II and without a com-
mission is another implicit recognition of the inadequacy of ar-
ticle II. Article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty should be
renegotiated and rewritten to reflect the limited territorial sov-
ereignty or equitable utilization theory, which has become the
most widely advocated by the international legal commu-
nity.' 36 This established principle of international law, ad-
hered to by the United States in the Columbia River contro-
versy 137 and advocated by Canada in the negotiations leading
to the Boundary Waters Treaty, 138 would permit use of bound-
ary waters only to the extent that no injury was done to other
riparian nations.3 9 At the very least, article II should be
amended to prohibit a nation from making unilateral diver-
sions without first consulting with other affected nations or
submitting its proposal to an international commission for re-
view. Only in this way can international water disputes be-
tween the United States and Canada be effectively resolved.
CONCLUSION
In the regulation of international waters, as in many other
areas of human conduct, the harmony of mankind depends on
the mutual recognition of needs and a cooperative effort to
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. INT'LJOINT COMM'N, IJC DOCKET No. 69, LIBBY DAM AND RESERVOIR (1954)
& INT'L JOINT COMM'N, IJC DOCKET No. 51, COLUMBIA RIVER (1944) & INT'L JOINT
COMM'N, IJC DOCKET No. 3, LAKE OF THE WOODS LEVELS (1912), reprinted in L.
BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 72-194.
136. D. LEMARQUAND, supra note 94, at 13.
137. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
139. See D. LEMARQUAND, supra note 94, at 13.
INTERNATIONAL BASIN DIVERSIONS
find a solution that most closely meets those needs. Article II
of the Boundary Waters Treaty is not a solution that meets the
needs of the United States and Canada in resolving their inter-
national water disputes.
Although recent U.S. proposals for large-scale diversions
out of Lake Michigan have been dropped, the prospect for sig-
nificant diversions from the Great Lakes basin persists, as the
population continues to move to more arid regions of the
United States and water shortages reach crisis levels. Any fu-
ture plan by the United States to divert significant amounts of
water from Lake Michigan will again focus attention on the ap-
plication of article II.
There is fairly strong evidence that both the U.S. and Ca-
nadian governments accept the doctrine of equitable utiliza-
tion as a rule of international law. Article II, however, is still in
the Boundary Waters Treaty and if invoked in a legal contest,
would displace this customary rule. As long as it exists, article
II will be used in arguments in controversial cases. To avoid
potential water conflicts in the future and to provide a better
mechanism for resolving international water disputes, article II
of the Boundary Waters Treaty should be amended to incorpo-
rate customary principles of international water law.
Tim A. Kalavrouziotis*
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Fordham University School of Law.
1989]
